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by Jack Elsby 
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE: 
ORDER OF PROOF 
In Hepple v. State, 31 Md. App. 525, 
358 A.2d 283 (1976), the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals carefully de-
fined the scope of the trial judge's discre-
tion concerning that which is admissible 
as rebuttal evidence. 
Chief Judge Orth, speaking for the 
court, noted that the usual order of proof 
was for the state to present its evidence 
in its case in chief, followed by the de-
fense's attempt to establish absence of 
guilt, and culminating in the state's re-
buttal. However, the "mere order of 
proof and under what circumstances 
evidence should be admitted or rejected 
when offered out of proper order" is 
clearly within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. In the rebuttal stage of the 
trial, therefore, the judge enjoys two dis-
cretions: (1) to permit the moving party 
to reopen its case to introduce evidence 
adducible in chief, and (2) to determine 
whether evidence offered to rebut is 
truly rebuttal evidence. 
Evidence adducible in chief is evi-
dence essential to a conviction, whereas 
rebuttal evidence includes "' ... any 
competent evidence which explains, or 
is a direct reply to, or a contradiction of, 
any new matter that has been brought 
into the case by the defense' " [d. at 530, 
358 A.2d at 287 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, statements of evidence ad-
ducible in chief are clearly distinct and 
separable from rebuttal evidence, and 
while it is within the trial judge's discre-
tion to admit evidence adducible in chief 
in the rebuttal stage of the trial, the judge 
cannot admit such evidence "as rebut-
tal". To do so would be an abuse of the 
trial judge's discretion as to what consti-
tutes rebuttal evidence and would be 
grounds for reversal where the admis-
sion is manifestly wrong and substan-
tially injurious to the defendant. 
NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF 
LANDLORD FOR CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITIES OF THIRD PARTIES 
In Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 
A.2d 548 (1976), decedent's widow and 
personal representative brought a 
wrongful death action claiming defen-
dant landlord breached a duty owed to 
decedent tenant Scott to protect him 
from criminal acts of third parties com-
mitted in common areas under the land-
lord's control, and that such breach was 
the proximate cause of Scott's death. 
Decedent Scott, who was a resident of 
a two hundred and ninety unit urban 
apartment complex, was killed by a 
shotgun blast in the apartment's under-
ground garage. This was the first act of 
personal harm to come to the landlord's 
attention, but he knew there was a high 
incidence of crime in the surrounding 
area. The landlord also knew that over a 
one and a half year period some of the 
tenants' apartments had been 
burglarized, their automobiles had been 
stolen from in front of the apartment, 
and on one occasion an employee of 
one of the retail shops had been robbed 
and raped. While the landlord was in-
stituting new security procedures at the 
time of Scott's murder, he had already 
installed extensive personnel and 
mechanical security. 
The court considered three questions: 
(1) Does Maryland law impose upon 
the landlord of an urban apartment 
complex a duty to tenants to protect 
them from the criminal acts of third 
parties committed in common areas 
within the landlord's control, and, if 
so, what is the extent of such duty? 
(2) If no duty exists generally, would 
such a duty be imposed if the land-
lord has knowledge of increasing 
criminal activity on the premises or 
in the surrounding neighborhood? 
(3) Would such a duty be imposed 
upon a landlord if such landlord has 
undertaken specific measures to 
protect his tenants from criminal acts 
of third parties? 
The court answered the first issue in 
the affirmative, but refused to apply a 
special duty standard of care used in 
common carrier-passenger cases. 
Rather, the court held that the landlord 
of urban apartment complexes must 
exercise reasonable care for the tenants' 
safety in common areas within the land-
lord's control, and that to require a 
greater standard of care would put a 
landlord' 'perilously close to the position 
of insurer of the tenants' safety." [d. at 
167, 359 A.2d at 553. 
In considering the second question, 
the court found that if the landlord 
knows, or should have known, of crimi-
nal activity against persons or property in 
the common areas, he has a duty to take 
reasonable measures to eliminate the 
conditions contributing to the criminal 
activity. The court indicated that since 
the landlord can affect the risk only 
within his own premises, then only crim-
inal acts occuring on the landlord's 
premises, and of which he knows or 
should have known, constitute relevant 
factors in determining whether the land-
lord exercised reasonable care. 
In answering the third question, the 
court noted that even if no duty existed 
to employ a particular level of security on 
the landlord's part, his improper per-
formance of such a voluntary act could, 
in particular circumstances, constitute a 
breach of duty. 
Finally, in considering whether the 
landlord's breach of the duty of reason-
able care is the proximate cause of a ten-
ant's injuries suffered at the hands of 
third parties, the court found that the 
breach by the landlord would result in 
liability only if the breach enhanced the 
likelihood of the particular criminal activ-
ity which occurred. 
by H. Jerome Fenzel 
and Milton Baxley 
BRUTON DISTINGUISHED 
In Brooks & Brooks v. State, 32 Md. 
App. 116, 359 A.2d 217 (1976), the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held 
that errors committed in admitting the 
confessions of co-defendants, because 
of Bruton v. United States, 341 U.S. 123 
(1968), were cured when each defen-
dant took the stand and subjected him-
self to cross-examination. While Bruton 
held that, in a joint trial, the admission of 
a non-testifying co-defendant's extraju-
dicial confession implicating the defen-
dant violated the right to confrontation, 
the need for applying the rule is negated 
when the co-defendant takes the stand 
and subjects himself to cross-
examination by the defendant's attor-
ney. 
CRIMINAL APPEAL DE NOVO 
MUST BE TRIED BASED UPON 
SAME CHARGING DOCUMENTS 
In Pinkett v. State, 30 Md. App. 458, 
352 A.2d 358 (1976), the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals held that an 
appeal to the Circuit Court of a criminal 
case tried in the District Court must be 
heard on the same charging documents. 
Pinkett was convicted in the District 
Court on the strength of a statement of 
charges and an arrest warrant. The Cir-
cuit Court tried him on the two previous 
charges plus two new charges. The 
Court remanded the two previous 
charges back to the District Court for 
retrial on the original charging docu-
ments. As to the new charges, based on 
a newly filed information, it was proper 
for the Circuit Court to try the defendant, 
even though the charges which had 
been an issue in the District Court had to 
be retried. 
In determining this point, the court dis-
tingUished this case from the holding of 
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
There, the Supreme Court held that 
after a jury determined that the accused 
was not one of the robbers involved, the 
state could not relitigate the same issue 
at a second trial. The court of special ap-
peals stated that Ashe "does not stand 
for the proposition that where the ac-
cused is convicted of one crime he may 
not be prosecuted for another crime aris-
ing out of the same factual cir-
cumstances." Pinkett, supra at 472-73, 
352 A.2d 367-68. 
SEIZURE OF HEROIN IN 
"ABANDONED" WASTE UPHELD 
WHERE THERE WAS NO 
INTRUSION INTO THE 
DEFENDANT'S BODY 
In Venner v. State, 30 Md. App. 599, 
354 A.2d 483 (1976), the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals held that it is 
not an illegal search or seizure when 
police come into possession of con-
traband, instrumentalities or fruits of 
crime, or mere evidence without violat-
ing the security of the defendant's per-
son or his house or other constitutionally 
protected area. Here, the police, after 
being called by a nurse, retrieved bal-
loons containing hashish oil from the 
defendant's bedpan. The court deter-
mined that Venner neither exercised or 
attempted to exercise any disposition or 
control over the waste, and had no ex-
pectation of privacy with respect to the 
disposition of his waste. Once the bal-
loons were deposited in the bedpan, 
they were abandoned property. 
The Court distinguished People v. 
Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 
624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975), where, 
pursuant to a search warrant, police ar-
rested the defendant, took her to the 
hospital, and ordered her stomach 
pumped. When the defendant resisted, 
she was strapped to the table and a tube 
was passed through her nose. Finally, 
she gave up and regurgitated balloons 
containing heroin. The court noted that 
in that case the intrusion was more than 
minor and the facts of the case consti-
tuted a condition other than the 
emergency condition present in 
Schmerber v. Califomia. 384 U.S. 757 
(1966). The court noted that Venner 
was never confronted by the police and 
that there was no intrusion into his body. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL 
UPHELD 
In James v. State, 31 Md. App. 666, 
358 A.2d 595 (1976), the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals held that a vio-
lation of the principle enunciated in 
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), 
was not reversible error where the court 
on appeal could take judicial notice of 
the fact that the Supreme Bench of Bal-
timore City, in 1963, assigned counsel to 
all felony cases and the docket entries 
disclosed that the defendant was repre-
sented by counsel. There a parole order 
was admitted into evidence by the trial 
court without establishing that the parole 
resulted from a trial at which the defen-
dant was represented by counselor 
knowingly and voluntarily waived coun-
sel. The court pointed to the fact that it 
could take notice of a matter, in this case, 
which was part of the public record in an 
effort to maintain judicial economy, de-
spite Fletcher v. Floumey, 198 Md. 53, 
81 A.2d 232 (1951), which stated that 
the "court will not travel outside the rec-
ord in order to take notice of proceed-
ings unless put into evidence." [d. at 60, 
81 A.2d at 235. 
LIMITATIONS UPON STATE'S USE 




In Taylor v. State, 360 A.2d 430 
(1976), the Maryland Court of Appeals 
held that it was reversible error to permit 
the prosecution to cross-examine the de-
fense's character witnesses about the de-
fendant's prior convictions without any 
prior introduction of the convictions. 
The court felt that what was impermissi-
ble in the questioning of the defendant 
should also be impermissible in the 
examination of character witnesses. 
The court avoided reaching the ques-
tion whether three recent Supreme 
Court decisions have tempered the hold-
ing of Michaelson v. United States, 335 
U.S. 469 (1948). In Michaelson, the 
Supreme Court held that a character 
witness for a criminal defendant might 
be cross-examined as to an arrest of the 
defendant, whether or not that arrest re-
sulted in a conviction. The recent cases, 
however, stand for the proposition that 
constitutionally firm convictions can not 
be used to support the guilt of the defen-
dant, Loper v. Belo, 405 U.S. 473 
(1972), enhance his punishment, United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), 
or impeach his credibility, Burgett v. 
Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). In this case, 
the error was harmless and did not 
prejudice the defendant, in view of the 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 
by John Crabbs 
NEW LIGHT ON VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY 
The recent decision of the Maryland 
Court of Appeals in Mabe v. B.P. Oil 
Corp., 31 Md. App. 221,356 A.2d 304 
(1976), if allowed to stand, may open a 
broad new area of vicarious liability in 
Maryland law. The Maryland Court of 
Appeals granted certiorari and oral ar-
gument was heard on November 5, 
1976. B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, No. 43, 
Sept. Term, 1976. 
Claude Mabe, while driving, pulled 
into a B.P. station and asked the atten-
dant for water for his radiator. He was 
given a can which contained not water, 
but some other liquid, which when 
spilled on the hot engine, exploded and 
injured Mabe. It was not disputed that 
the injury was the result of the negli-
gence of the station attendant who gave 
him the can. The only issue was 
whether B.P. Corporation was vicari-
ously liable for the negligence. 
After a jury verdict for Mabe, the trial 
judge, upon proper motion, entered a 
judgment n.o.v. for B.P. Mabe appealed 
on the grounds that there was sufficient 
evidence to present a jury question, 
"either of the existence of an actual 
agency relationship between B.P. and 
the station operator, or of an apparent 
agency based on manifestation thereof 
by B.P., upon which appellant relied." 
[d. at 226, 356 A.2d at 308. 
It is settled under Maryland law that 
vicarious liability for torts of an agent 
exists only if that agent is a servant. Gal-
lagher's Estate v. Battle, 209 Md. 592, 
122 A.2d 93 (1956). Thus it must be as-
sumed that the grounds of appeal are the 
existence of a jury question as to the 
applicability of the doctrine of respon-
deat superior by estoppel. 
From the facts, there appears little dif-
ficulty in finding sufficient evidence for a 
jury question as to the existence of a 
master-servant relationship. On that 
point the inquiry is whether B.P. had the 
right of control over the station manager 
in respect to the work to be performed. 
See State ex reI. Bozango v. 
Blumenthal-Kahn Elec. Co., 162 Md. 
84,159 A. 106 (1932). 
Facts of the case relevant to this ques-
tion are: (1) the station manager was 
paid through a reciprocal lease agree-
ment on commissions for fuel sold, (2) 
he was not permitted, by agreement, to 
use the premises for repair or mainte-
nance of automobiles, (3) he was not al-
lowed to affix any sign, fixture or device 
to the station without permission from 
B.P., and (4) the court suggests that 
there was coercion by the company to 
force the manager to accept "sugges-
tions" of a sales representative. 
The court suggests insulation of the 
company from the manager by means of 
a reciprocal lease agreement, but this is 
not convincing. The cases cited in sup-
port of this proposition are not totally 
apposite. In all of the cases used by the 
court on this point, the lease agreement 
was only one of the factors looked at, 
and the main discussion of the lease pro-
visions centered around liability of own-
ers or possessors of land and not the 
issue of master-servant relation. 
Rather than take the direct conven-
tional route to the imposition of liability, 
the court resorted to the "emerging doc-
trine" of the "apparent servant". Mabe, 
supra at 233,357 A.2d at 312. This doc-
trine as stated by the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §267 (1957) 
is: 
One who represents that another is his 
servant or other agent and thereby 
causes a third person to rely upon the 
care or skill of such apparent agent is 
subject to liability to the third person 
for harm caused by the lack of care or 
skill of the one appearing to be the 
servant or other agent as if he were 
such. 
The broad extension of the law is not in 
accepting this statement as the law in 
Maryland, but in the meager facts re-
quired as the basis of representing that 
another is his servant. 
In considering the question, it is 
necessary to set aside those facts men-
tioned above with respect to the exis-
tence of an actual master-servant rela-
tionship, as these are not representations 
to Mabe. The existence of actual and 
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apparent master-servant relationships 
are two distinct questions which must be 
carefully separated. 
The facts which were the basis of the 
apparent master-servant repre-
sentations were: (1) a large B.P. sign at 
the station, (2) the B.P. trademark on the 
oil cans, the pumps and "everything" 
including the attendant's uniforms. The 
court also noted B.P.'s national and re-
gional sales campaigns, as well as adver-
tising on T.V. and in periodicals and the 
yellow pages. The dissenting opinion 
states, however, that there was no evi-
dence of either the contents of this ad-
vertising, nor that the plaintiff had any 
awareness of its existence. Without 
awareness, Mabe certainly could not 
photo by Chris Michael 
have relied on these facts as representa-
tive of the existence of the master-
servant relation. 
If the Maryland Court of Appeals, in its 
consideration of the issue, accepts the 
apparent servant basis of liability in the 
case, the court would do well to give 




by Len Moodispaw 
For years gun advocates have been 
quoting the second amendment to sup-
port their claim that the Constitution 
gives Americans the right to bear arms. 
However, constitutional scholars have 
recently discovered evidence that may 
throw the National Rifle Association into 
disarray. It is the diary of one of the au-
thors of the Bill of Rights, written at the 
time that the first ten amendments were 
being drafted. We were fortunate 
enough to get a peek at that diary and an 
exerpt follows: 
Circa 1789 
Went to dinner with Madison, Mason 
and Adams. We felt like celebrating be-
cause we finished drafting the second 
amendment. ltfinally read that a militia is 
needed for national security and the 
Government could call on people to 
serve if needed. 
Hamilton wanted to add a phrase 
about everybody having the right to 
keep knives, guns, or any weapons they 
wanted. We hooted him out of the room. 
We could not imagine letting everyone 
run around with guns. Our soldiers 
drove General Washington crazy during 
the war. He claims we shot more of our 
own men than the Redcoats did! In one 
battle we had 14 casualties and that was 
before the British arrived! 
We were talking about the logistical 
problems we were encountering in get-
